Why and How Anti-Regime Protests Keep Returning in Iran

Over the past five days, protests have broken out in multiple Iranian cities, with slogans targeting the Iranian regime as a whole. Nationwide protests with explicitly anti-regime slogans are not new; similar episodes occurred in 2017, 2019, and 2022. At the same time, protests centered on socioeconomic demands—better wages, working conditions, pensions, and cost of living—are a regular feature of political life in Iran and take place almost weekly among different occupational groups and ordinary citizens.

What distinguishes the current episode is the escalation of socioeconomic grievances into political demands. Why does this happen?

Economic conditions in Iran have deteriorated steadily over the past several years due to a combination of U.S. sanctions and deepening domestic mismanagement. This mismanagement is closely tied to increasing authoritarianism: loyalty has been prioritized over expertise, progressively undermining the state’s problem-solving capacity. As a result, when bazaar shopkeepers face currency depreciation or rising costs, they increasingly recognize these as political problems with structural roots—problems that cannot be resolved without political change. Yet the path to such change is blocked. Under these conditions, economic grievances naturally escalate into demands against the regime itself.

Like previous protest waves, the current episode lacks centralized leadership or formal organization. Initial mobilization appears to have emerged through bazaar networks, followed by student mobilization and the spread of protests beyond bazaar spaces into other cities.

Protest demands are diverse and at times contradictory. In some cities and bazaar districts, slogans supporting the Pahlavi monarchy have been heard. At the same time, university students have chanted slogans rejecting both the autocracy of the Islamic Republic and the despotism of the monarchy. Crucially, the geography of pro-monarchy slogans is not random. Such chants tend to appear in districts that are predominantly Persian-speaking, Lor, or Caspian, while they are largely absent—and often actively rejected—in more marginalized regions, including Kurdish, Baluchi, Turkmen, and Arab areas, as well as in Sunni-majority districts. Pro-Pahlavi slogans are also notably absent in Turkic-speaking areas. This spatial pattern suggests that the Pahlavi project increasingly resonates as a political vision grounded in ethnic hierarchy. Over recent years, tensions between monarchist groups and other segments of the opposition have intensified, and these divisions are now clearly visible in the geographic distribution of protest slogans.

The spread of pro-Pahlavi slogans closely maps onto Iran’s internal ethnic hierarchy. Persian-speaking regions constitute the dominant group, with the highest levels of representation within the political elite and greater access to socioeconomic resources. Caspian regions are generally well-off and well integrated into elite networks. Lors occupy a junior position within power structures—represented politically but disadvantaged in some socioeconomic domains. Among other ethnolinguistic groups, Azeris function as junior partners in political power yet often experience cultural marginalization. Kurds, Baluchis, Turkmen, and Arabs, by contrast, remain politically excluded and face varying degrees of socioeconomic marginalization. Following the 2022 protest wave—marked by high participation in Kurdish and Sunni areas—the election of Pezeshkian and subsequent measures, such as appointing governors and presidential deputies from marginalized ethnic groups, constituted partial concessions to these constituencies. At present, protest activity in these regions remains limited. In the 2022 election, despite historically low turnout, Pezeshkian received disproportionate support from Kurdish, Baluchi, Sunni, and Turkic areas.

The Islamic Republic has extensive experience suppressing dissent. In the short term, repression is the dominant response; in the longer term, limited openings or partial concessions are sometimes offered—but rarely in ways that address protesters’ core demands. This strategy does not resolve the underlying causes of unrest. As a result, Iran continues to experience frequent, cyclical outbreaks of anti-regime protest.

As I have shown with my co-authors in a recent working paper, it is often the trigger of a protest episode that shapes its geography. In 2019, a sudden fuel price hike triggered protests that were especially intense in districts hosting oil and gas facilities. In 2022, the death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the morality police activated feminist networks and mobilization in Kurdish and Sunni areas, reflecting Amini’s own background. In that episode, pro-monarchy slogans were largely absent, as these constituencies have little affinity with the monarchy.

The power of such triggers is amplified precisely because organized opposition remains weak. Rather than coordinated leadership initiating protest waves, specific shocks—economic crises, policy changes, or acts of violence—ignite mobilization. Yet for the same reason, protests often remain limited in scope and fail to fully bridge across all social groups with grievances.